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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/3/1/3RESEARCH Open AccessPatients’ mobility as an indicator for (in)efficiency:
a panel data analysis on Italian health care
authorities
Elisabetta Mafrolla1* and Eugenio D'Amico2Abstract
This paper investigates the influence of internal managerial patterns of heath care authorities on the decision of
patients to migrate towards different health care organizations to avail treatments. The efficiency and productivity
issues are analyzed, considering the (passive) migration as a proxy for the (in)efficient service availed. We follow the
“vote by feet” theorization by Tiebout , assuming that citizens can choose to avail a health treatment in a public
service provider different from their resident one. The choice for a center that is far from home implies a negative
judgment to the alternative health care supplier that is closer to the patient. Testing Fixed Effects Panel Model on a
sample of Italian health care authorities, a strong correlation is found among variables in our model and some
relevant dependence is tested between patients’ mobility behavior and their resident authorities’ efficiency in
allocating resources on the proper operating cost. Spending in the proper way on health care could bring about an
enhancement of performances. Instead, wasting resources is immediately perceived by the patient, who
consequently seems to move to a different health care authority.
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Various empirical studies, investigating efficiency in
health care [1], distinguish themselves primarily by the
object of the investigation, then by the model adopted,
and finally by the parameters chosen.
The larger target of essays in the available literature
is the hospital, in its various configurations [1-3],
searching similarities and differences between the
relevant characteristics of the clinic, like public and
private proprietorship and management [4,5], for-
profit and not-for-profit organizations [6], specialist
and general hospitals [7]. Another important branch
of studies deals with national and local health care
programs and systems [8]. Much more limited is the
number of works about the health care peripheral* Correspondence: e.mafrolla@unifg.it
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origauthorities (or districts), which can be investigated on
the micro, macro, and meso levels.
The second important question is the choice of the
research empirical model adopted. We basically distin-
guish three main categories of studies. Farrell [9] proposes
the fortunate data envelopment analysis (DEA), a para-
metric test to individuate which entity is closer to an opti-
mal ideal frontier. The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
[10] is the most important alternative parametric method
adopted to individuate the productivity of organizations.
Lastly, the classic value based analysis (VBA) unleashes
the existing debate on the choice between parametric and
nonparametric methods [11]. Being generally consistent
with both the other studies, it offers a less mathematical
and statistical sophisticated model, looking for a simple
ratio analysis and a linear or nonlinear welfare function in
order to investigate the efficiency issue [12,13].
In order to measure efficiency correctly, several differ-
ent production functions are proposed, which barelyr. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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focusing instead on questions related to technical and
technological efficiency [14,15]. Researchers propose
various forms for that function, some of which had great
academic approval [16,17], others less [18]. In any case,
a common set of rules for the proper measurement of
efficiency in health care is still lacking. The concept of
efficiency itself is variously used by researchers with dif-
ferent scopes, causing subsequent difficulties in the
comparison and generalization of findings [19].
Overwhelmingly, literature follows the “new public
management” approach [20], looking for a precise and
objective measurement of the efficiency, thus studying
the issue largely from the clinical perspective, often ex-
cluding the patient’s perception of service quality [21].
Nevertheless, in the last 30 years, an interesting branch
of studies analyzes the quality of health care services
[22], even investigating the satisfaction of the patients.
With that aim, many measures of patients’ satisfaction
have been developed, making it difficult to individuate
the most sensible and widely applicable one [23]. Further-
more, comparing the results across different researches is
quite difficult due to the polymorphic structure of the
conducted surveys and due to the emotional and subject-
ive involvement of the patients interviewed [24].
This paper investigates whether and how in public
health care (in)efficient spending decisions influence
positively (negatively) the preference of patients for a
medical center rather than others.
Our research is located in the field of empirical research
on health care economics, investigating the question of the
(in)efficiency in health care authorities (HCAs), adopting a
VBA approach. We particularly appreciate the VBA be-
cause it gives the opportunity to monitor the main
characteristics of the organization over space and time.
After studying the behavior of the sample over the given
period and noticing the effect of different national and re-
gional policies on our indicators, we use the econometric
panel modeling to regress data and infer relations between
the various characteristics of the HCA as a firm.
Furthermore, we locate our research in the field of re-
gional studies, choosing a sample of HCAs operating in
Apulia, Italy, over the period 2001–2010. To our know-
ledge, a few academic analyses empirically investigate
the efficiency issue in health care in Italy and most of them
are focused on cases from northern Italy [25-29]. Only
Dell’Anno & Longo [30] inspect a case from Southern Italy,
focusing on hospitals and HCAs in Apulia, adopting the
SFA and finding interesting positive relations between the
cost efficiency and the presence of university departments
in the medical center.
Compared to available Italian literature, our study
involves a case from southern Italy, investigates a longer
period of time (nine years, instead of the four analyzedby Dell’Anno & Longo), and adopts different variables
and research model (as described below), considering
the HCA as a firm, with the aim of maximizing the
results and optimizing the expenses.
The paper is structured as follows: after a brief intro-
duction to the issue and to previous literature (part I), in
part II, we describe our research question and locate it
theoretically; in part III, we describe methods and sam-
ple and give a snapshot of HCAs in Italy, and particu-
larly, a brief overview of the last 10 years of public health
care in Apulia (our sample); in part IV, show results; and
finally, in part V, we discuss some relevant findings.
Theory and research development
We study the (in)efficiency issue in health care from an
unusual perspective, the one of HCA as a firm, adopting
an innovative way of measuring the performance. In our
view, efficiency is a measure of the performance of the
firm, calculated as the relation between the outcome
(i.e., the migratory phenomenon) and the consumption
of resources (i.e., our clinical and monetary independent
variables) that characterize the analyzed production
process.
Our dependent variable measures the mobility of the
population for health treatments from one HCA to an-
other. We consider this variable as a good proxy for
quality in health care services provided in a HCA due to
the fact that mobility is basically driven by the expect-
ation of the quality of services supplied in the HCA of
destination, compared to a lower quality experienced (or
expected) in the resident HCA. Thus, the patients value
the relative quality of services provided in different
HCAs more than the easier access to those supplied in
the proximity of their own resident HCA.
The use of the mobility factor as a proxy for efficiency
in public services is actually well documented in the
economic literature. More than 50 years ago, while
explaining the basic difference between the provision of
national and local services, Tiebout [31] stated that for
those services supplied at the local level, “the consumer-
voter moves to that community whose local government
best satisfies his set of preferences.” (p. 418) In Italy, the
national health care system provides a main common
framework of service supply (and related payments),
which can only partially vary at the local (i.e., regional)
level. Thus, basically, most of the services are supplied
all over the nation at the same cost to the patient. Fur-
thermore, in Italy, the patients have a fundamental right
to choose the medical center that they trust more. Thus,
the theory by Tiebout could find an interesting empirical
test in the Italian HCAs system, where the phenomenon
of mobility can be observed.
Our first hypothesis is the existence of a relationship
between the different inputs of health care supply and
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out in search of a higher quality of services. Inputs of
health care supply, in our managerial perspective, are ba-
sically the various structures of operating costs adopted
by each HCA (considered as a firm). With that aim, we
try and investigate the different patient behaviors chan-
ging the typology of expense. Spending on some factors
of production actually could be a waste. Spending on
other constituents of the production process instead
could be an investment. We hypothesize that the
patients value the operating cost structure of the HCA
and move from one to the other (i.e., migrate) by valuing
the efficient spending choices.
Our second hypothesis tries to partially clear the big-
gest hurdle while dealing with Tiebout’s assumptions:
the bias of the perfect mobility of patients. Dividing the
total migration of patients into extra-regional and infra-
regional phenomena, we test the relevance of the spatial
pattern in the “vote by their feet” decision of the patients.Methods
Sample description
The sample is a panel composed of nine time series
(years 2001 to 2009) and six cross sections, representing
the HCAs located in Apulia, totally 54 firm-year
observations.
The HCA (Azienda Sanitaria Locale - ASL) is the
public peripheral entity supplying health care services in
Italy. HCAs work with internally managed clinical
centers and provide basic medical services of prevention,
diagnosis, and the treatment of diseases. Clinical centers
in Italy can even be run in autonomy, out of the HCAs’
control, both in a public and private juridical and eco-
nomic capacity.Table 1 Spinn-offs and mergers in Apulia health care system
Cross section units 2001-2004 2005-2006






BT NOT EXISTING BT (including most of
and 3 towns of FG/2,
FG FG/1 FG/1




TA TA TAThe number and composition of the HCAs in Apulia
notably changes over time (see Table 1). The Italian na-
tional health care system in 1992 (d.lgs. n. 502) devolved
autonomous powers (and responsibilities) to local health
authorities and asked for a rationalization of costs and ef-
ficiency of services. In the second half of the 1990s, the 55
existing HCAs were merged, creating 12 HCAs and four
autonomous public hospitals (Aziende Ospedaliere). Many
changes occurred in the past 15 years in the legal struc-
ture and the economic organization of the regional health
care systems. In 2001, the national law gave further
powers to the regional authorities, which carried on
several spin-outs and mergers of medical centers. In
2005, the constitution of a new provincial administration
caused the spin-off and merger of the sector, with the cre-
ation of the new Barletta-Andria-Trani HCA. On January
1, 2007, the important merger of three groups of HCAs
defined a rigid division of the HCA per province
(Bari, Brindisi, Barletta-Andria-Trani, Foggia, Lecce, and
Taranto, in acronyms respectively BA, BR, BT, FG, LE,
TA), ranking the BA HCA among the most populous
health care districts in Italy. The 2011 landscape of Apulia
regional health care system presents six HCAs; two au-
tonomous public hospitals and two institutes for health
care and research (so called Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a
Carattere Scientifico – IRCCS) complete the public supply
of health treatments in Apulia.Description of variables
We summed up information on activities, costs, and
population, considering the mergers occurring over time
as if they occurred in 2001.
We collected the dataset made up of different kinds of
variables.over last decade
2007-2010
A/1 and minus 3 towns) BA (merger of BA/2, BA/3, BA/4, BA/5)
BR
ex-BA/1, 3 towns of BA/2
spinned-off and merged)
BT
FG (merger of FG/1, FG/2, FG/3)
LE
TA
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from the resident HCA towards other HCAs (out or in
the regional limits). As explained earlier, we analyze the
overall migration, decomposing it into the extra-regional
migration scaled by population (ERM) and the infra-
regional migration to population (IRM). IRM suffers less
than ERM due to the bias of the spatial sacrifice to reach
the selected service supplier. We calculate migration as
the difference between the number of inhabitants of the
target HCA who avail a health care service in a different
HCA (passive migration) and the number of patients
coming to the target HCA for treatments (active migra-
tion). This difference in Apulia is always a passive bal-
ance of migration; consequently, we omit the minus sign
and always consider the prevalence of the passive over
the active migration in our index.
Second, the regressors explain different characteristics:
i. The adequacy of infrastructures available in a HCA
to the needs of the resident population: We calculate
OBTB as ratio of the number of occupied beds in
one year to the number of available beds. We add
two dichotomic variables to isolate the cases of
extreme under-utilization (DummyUNDER = 1 if
OBTB < 0.65, 0 otherwise) and over-utilization
(DummyOVER = 1 if OBTB > 0.89, 0 otherwise) of
assets and general costs.
ii. The epidemiologic and demographic characteristics of
the inhabitant population of the target HCA: We
consider the hospitalization index OBPOP, calculated
as ratio of the number of occupied beds to the
resident population, a proxy for those characteristics.
iii. A series of typical managerial parameters, measuring
the costs of the HCA as a firm: Thus, we reported:- MEDPERS (= Income Statement item #B00800),
costs of the medical personnel to the population;
- OTHPERS (= Income Statement items #B00810 +
#B00820 + #B00830), costs of professional,
technical, and administrative human resources to
the population;
- PHARM (= Income Statement item #B01005),
expenses for surgery and medical materials and
pharmaceuticals to the population;
- TOTPROD (= Income Statement item #B99999),
total typical costs of production (B area of the
income statement) to the population.The regressand and the variables, sub i) and sub ii),
are deduced using data kindly provided by Svimservice
Srl, a private company offering informative services to
the Apulia Regional Authority. The variables in sub iii)
are collected, elaborating the income statements publicly
given out by the Italian Health Care Ministry. Listedvariables are scaled by population, measured by the
Italian Statistic Institute (ISTAT).
Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
About the dependent variables, at a glance, the migra-
tion indexes show that, on average, more than 4% of the
resident population crosses the HCA’s borders to get
health treatments and 1% goes even past the regional
limits. The maximum value of the IRM (7%) and ERM
(2%) indexes confirm the opinion that Apulia suffers one
of the strongest health care passive migration phenom-
ena in Italy. The distribution of ERM is not too far from
the Gaussian, with skew. = −0.56 and kurt. = −0.65, while
IRM is more symmetric (skew. = 0.25) and quite
platikurtic (kurt. = −1.47). These conditions predict a
good probability of encountering a normal distribu-
tion of the idiosyncratic errors after the regression
analysis. In the end, the correlation between the two
dependent variables is quite low (ρ = 0.21; p-value = 0.12).
Thus, we expect different findings from the parallel
analysis of the two components of the passive migra-
tion phenomenon.
The OBTB index has an average value of 0.69 and a
standard deviation of 0.16. If the index were too close to
1, the motivation of migration could be strictly joined to
the inadequate capacity of the services offered. If the
index were too low, the infrastructures could be ineffi-
ciently oversized. Thus, considering that max(OBTB) =
0.95 and min(OBTB) = 0.19, we can state that the infra-
structure is generally not adequate to the needs because
of situations pertaining both to the deficiency and super-
fluity in investments. With the aim of measuring separ-
ately the issues of under-utilization and over-utilization,
we add two dichotomic variables. DummyUNDER equals
1 when the OBTB gets to excessively low levels (OBTB
< 0.65). DummyOVER equals 1 when the OBTB gets to
excessively high levels (OBTB > 0.89). In the case of the
physiological levels of OBTB, both DummyUNDER and
DummyOVER equal 0. The distribution of the OBTB
index is definitely asymmetric (skew. = −1.47) and
sharply leptokurtic (kurt. = 2.16).
The hospitalization index (OBPOP) is generally quite
close to 1, with an almost normal distribution (skew. =
−0.61; kurt. = 0.26).
Average total operating costs per inhabitant (TOTPROD)
are 1448 €; the minimum is 722 € and the maximum is
1792 €, with an asymmetric (skew. = −1.35) and leptokurtic
(kurt.= 1.26) distribution. The distribution of other kinds
of cost indexes (MEDPERS, OTHPERS, and PHARM) is
quite symmetric (−1 < skew. < 1) and platikurtic (kurt. < 0).
Statistic significant correlations (Table 3) between inde-
pendent variables are neither too high (ρ < 0.7) nor too
low (ρ > 0.25), avoiding problems of perfect correlations
and encouraging the probability of consistent findings
from the regression analysis.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Min Max St.dev. Var.coeff. Skew. Curt.
OBTB 0.69708 0.74856 0.19017 0.95182 0.16169 0.23196 −1.4706 2.1637
OBPOP 0.92309 0.94209 0.53816 1.1612 0.15893 0.17217 −0.61933 −0.2627
DummyOVER 0.05556 0 0 1 0.16169 4.1618 3.8806 13.059
DummyUNDER 0.24074 0 0 1 0.15893 1.7926 1.2128 −0.52908
MEDPERS 293.07 292.96 174.97 431.67 76.284 0.26029 −0.0052274 −1.2854
OTHPERS 70.314 68.434 51.326 90.778 12.090 0.17188 0.14327 −1.3795
PHARM 139.97 122.76 56.962 282.87 55.42 0.39596 0.74423 −0.12039
TOTPROD 1448.30 1527.30 721.59 1791.60 266.63 0.18410 −1.3573 1.2621
ERM 0.011148 0.012417 0.0021194 0.018535 0.0040462 0.36295 −0.59507 −0.65582
IRM 0.030131 0.027478 0.0064730 0.066611 0.019265 0.63938 0.25064 −1.4679
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collinearity event for each independent variable included
in our model (VIFs < 5.5).
Data description
To measure the quality of health care supply in Apulia,
we consider one of the most explicative trackers for a
diagnostic test of (in)efficiency, studying migration flows
between the HCAs over the decade 2001–2010. We use
information on the clinical activity of HCAs kindly
provided by Svimservice S.r.l. (under the authorization
of the Apulia Regional Authority), who prepares the
official regional database. We report the number of
patients crossing the borders of the target HCA and
availing health care treatments from other HCAs located
in Apulia (infra-regional migration, in symbols: IRM)Table 3 Pearsons’ correlation analysis*




















* In brackets: two-tails p-values.and out of the regional borderlines (extra-regional mi-
gration: ERM). These variables are scaled by population.
As expected, most of the total migration is addressed to
other HCAs of Apulia. To explain this phenomenon, we
could enumerate many reasons out of our variables.
First, the health care system is shaped on the idea of a
capillary covering the whole regional territory (and
population) only for basic treatments. Specialist clinics
and hospitals are located only in a few strategic centers
of excellence. Thus, to take advantage of a specialized
medical center, the patient of a HCA has to often move
to a neighboring HCA. Then, the IRM is consistent be-
cause it is planned ex ante in an overall regional health
care system. Second, due to the geographic proximity of
the other HCAs in the same region, patients who are
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gion with a limited sacrifice of time and money. Lastly,
only those who can financially afford the extra expense
of traveling and lodging out of the regional borders de-
cide to renounce the treatment in their own HCA, hop-
ing to get services of higher quality in the elected HCA.
Thus, we predict spatial proximity is a relevant bias in
the “vote by their feet” decision of patients.
The trend in patients’ mobility slightly grows over the
decade. It is easy to identify two different attitudes
grouping the HCAs. The HCAs with a smaller number of
inhabitants (BT, BR, TA) experienced a higher level of mi-
gration (around 0.6), that goes up over time. In the smaller
HCA, BT, the internal mobility rapidly arises in 2005 and
2006, when the BT HCA is created. A different position is
occupied by BA, FG, and LE, where the trend is either
quite constant or decreasing (LE) over time and the IRM
index assesses around 0.2. In those areas, important au-
tonomous public hospitals mitigate the migration effect
and attract people from other HCAs. We measure migra-
tion as the number of people crossing geographic borders,
and the support for the presence of autonomous public
hospitals is quite strong and lowers the intercept of the
time series. The bias affects the infra-regional migration
index, but not the extra-regional one, clearly reporting the
choice of patients for a higher quality health care supply.
People from BT and FG recurred to extra-region migration
more than other HCAs patients.
The main structural independent variable we analyze
is the number of beds provided in public hospitals and
other clinics internally managed by HCAsa [32]. The
total number of beds available in the whole region slightly
deflects over the decade, from 15,440 beds in 2001 to
14,239 in 2010, losing 7.8% in 10 years, mirroring the na-
tional and regional policies of rationalization of offerings
and reduction of costs. In 2001, 33% of the beds were in
the most populous HCA (BA) and 25% were in LE (a
much less populous area). The distribution keeps quite
constant up to 2010, when 29% of the total beds are
recorded in BA, 21% are in LE, 16% in TA, 15% in FG,
11% in BR, and 7% in BT. This unequal distribution is
sensibly justified by the different concentrations ofinhabitants. The relative configuration of the item (scaled
by the number of inhabitants) is quite homogeneous
among the different HCAs. On average, the total number
of beds in hospitals and clinics (day hospitals included)
represents 0.34% of the resident population. The ratio
grows to a maximum of 0.49% (LE, 2001) and slopes down
to 0.2% in BT. Most of the beds (12,887 in 2010) is
dedicated to general hospitalization. Bed units for day hos-
pital were totally 65 in 2001 and 816 in 2010. Wards
assigned to rehabilitation opened in 2003, and in 2010, we
count 536 beds for rehabilitation in Apulia HCAs’ internal
hospitals. This finding is consistent with the decision of
the regional government of changing some characteristics
of the internally managed hospitals, partially converted, in
those days, from general hospitals to rehabilitation clinics
and specialized medical centers.
The adequacy of beds complementing the needs of the
resident population is better investigated through the ana-
lysis of the intensiveness of the usage of structures, com-
bining the number of occupied beds to the total bed units
(OBTB). The ratio changes over time, registering a great
increase in 2002 and 2003, lowering in 2004, and keeping
a quite constant average rate up to 2010. The Italian na-
tional average of OBTB is 0.77. Levels of the index lower
than 0.77 are registered quite often in Apulia in most of
the HCAs, where the mean of the observations over the
decade is 0.69. In order to isolate those cases where the
index has underperformed, and where we expect ineffi-
ciencies due to excessive expenditure on overheads and
general operating costs, we add to our model a dummy
variable (DummyUNDER), counting 1 if the index goes
below a physiological average level of utilization, and 0
otherwise. We measure that grey area as the average of
the index minus the variance of index, computed at a
national Italian level: OBTBi <Av(OBTBIt)-var(OBTBIt) =
0.77-0.12 = 0.65. Contrarily, sometimes the index offers an
image of overcrowded hospitals and clinics. In 7% of cases,
it overwhelms the upper limit of 0.89, where OBTBi >Av
(OBTBIt) + var(OBTBIt) = 0.77 + 0.12 = 0.89. In those cases,
we expect a high grade of scale efficiency due to the inten-
sive utilization of assets and services, but a low satisfaction
degree of patients, who probably suffer a low quality of
health care supply due to long queuing and waiting lists.
We try and extract the meaning of the outbalance of the
described consequences of overcrowded medical centers,
adding to the model a dummy variable (DummyOVER)
that is 1 if the index goes above the physiological average
level of utilization, and 0 otherwise. The above-limit is the
described 0.89. We expect out-migration to be influenced
in two opposite directions by the two exposed aspects of
overcrowding in the HCAs’ medical centers. Thus, the
predicted sign of DummyOVER is in doubt and the ap-
plication to our case can help to understand which cir-
cumstance is more relevant to the patient. Actually, there
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center is overcrowded, it probably has a great appeal to
the patients; on the contrary, a deserted health care de-
partment can make the patient suspicious about the qual-
ity of supply. Thus, the OBTB apparently influences a
portion of the out-migration decision. We cannot adopt
the GMM model to correct endogeneity due to N < 10.
Thus, we appoint the national level of OBTB as an instru-
mental variable to our model and extract its significance,
calculating DummyUNDER and DummyOVER.
The hospitalization index, calculated as the quotient
OBPOP, measures the degree of utilization of the bed
units, scaled by the number of resident population. With
that aim, we capture the different dispositions of the
population to availing care treatments, depending mostly
on the demographic and epidemiologic factors. As
expected, the variance in the index is not relevant and is
more marked among HCAs than over the years. This is
hardly a control variable to our model and we have no
prediction as to the sign of the coefficient.
To explore specific reasons of (in)efficiency of the
HCAs, we use Annual Financial Reporting and analyze
how they spend money to supply services [33]. We ap-
point the most relevant items included in the income
statement of the HCAs (data available for years 2001 to
2009), both for the magnitude and for the strategic rele-
vance of the cost in a health care organization. To com-
pare the information and find out resemblances and
differences among the groups and over time, we divide
the data by the resident population.
We study the cost of personnel, splitting it into phys-
ician (item #B00800 of the Income Statement) and non-
physician (items #B00810 + #B00820 + #B00830) human
resources (MEDPERS and OTHPERS, respectively). We
find a regular growing trend of medical labor costs and
realize that the difference existing between various HCAs
in 2001 is kept over time and gets a little wider in 2009.
On average, every year, each HCA spends 293€ per citizen
to pay the salaries of physicians providing necessary public
health care services. The increase in MEDPERS cannot be
considered an evidence of inefficiency. Most of the aca-
demic empirical researches on patients’ satisfaction find a
positive relation between resources invested in physicians
and the patients’ perception of the quality of the health
treatment [14]. Enhancing the expenditure, HCAs accu-
mulate the number and quality of doctors offering
treatments, diminishing the probability of patients’ migra-
tion. In 2010, 3879 family doctors (general and pediatric)
were tenured in HCAs in Apulia, equally distributed on
the regional territory in proportion with the number of
inhabitants. In the same year, emergency clinical service
was evenly well distributed among HCAs and occupied
1773 doctors, while 26% of outpatient physician personnel
(totally 1734) worked in BA and 26% worked in FG,suggesting the possibility of an oversized allocation of
resources in FG, where the population is smaller.
Even the cost of professional, technical, and administra-
tive human resources (OTHPERS) slightly grows over the
decade. Only in TA, a decrease of the cost is seen in four
observed years (2003–2007), growing again in 2008 and
2009. Differences among the HCAs are quite marked, but
the growing trend is almost contained everywhere since
2003. Probably the phenomenon is linked to the
rationalization and merger strategies adopted first in 2002
and again in 2007, with the aim of cutting superfluous dir-
ectional, administrative, and technical costs. Another
tracker for (in)efficiency in the resource allocation is the
total number of personnel tenured in a managerial position
(both physician and non-physician employees)—6965 over
a total number of 31,484 workers in the HCAs of the re-
gion. Directional and non-clinical costs’ intensification over
time should be avoided in order to offer an efficient health
care system. We predict the bigger the OTHPERS, the lar-
ger the inefficiency (and out-migration).
Another relevant cost category in health care is due to
surgery, clinical and medical provisions, and pharma-
ceuticals (PHARM = item #B01005). Sensibly, this cost
varies quite symmetrically over cross-sections and regu-
larly changes its pendency over time, first growing, then
lowering, and finally growing again. The regular path is
due to some important biasing elements. First, the index
depends on the general level of health of the population,
which does not vary over time and space in a big way. Sec-
ond, it is strictly correlated with regional reimbursement
policies. Then, changing the policy, even the pendency of
the index changes, especially affecting the extra-regional
phenomenon. Inhabitants should avoid this expense get-
ting thinner. Thus, we predominantly expect a negative
relation between the PHARM and the extra-regional mo-
bility of the patients. A third component affects the index
and could be interesting in our research. The price of
products is not the same everywhere, even if markets are
basically the same all over Italy. The waste of money could
be related to the simple wastage of resources or even to a
bad contractual activity of the buyer. Thus, even PHARM
measures the inefficient allocation of resources due to
managerial incompetence. Hence, even if we stated earlier
that the higher the PHARM, the better, we might find an
inefficiency deterrent component in it that averts this kind
of undesirable expenditure. A positive relation with the
dependent variable is also possible, especially in migration
within the region, due to the constancy of pharmaceutical
spending policy within Apulia.
The last measure of costs we use is a linear combi-
nation of the others plus all residual costs of production
(TOTPROD = item #B99999). That is the most synthetic
index we could use to measure (in)efficiency in produ-
cing health care services. The index follows a constant
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groups diminishes over time. The trend in the BT HCA
clearly shows the adaptation of the index to the average
of other HCAs at the moment of the merger (2005–
2006). Due to the comprehensive managerial signifi-
cance of the total costs of production, it is basically
addressed in literature as a measure of inefficiency due
to relevant wastage [22].
Econometric model
In order to investigate how the (in)efficiency in HCAs is
related to the independent variables selected and
explained above, we use infra-region and extra-region
migration indexes in parallel (ERM and IRM, respect-
ively) as proxies for (in)efficiency and test the following
regressions under the pooled OLS Model:
ERMi ¼ β0 þ β1OBTBi þ β2DummyUNDERi
þβ3DummyOVERi þ β4OBPOPi
þβ5MEDPERSi þ β6OTHPERSi þ β7PHARMi
þβ8TOTPRODi þ ui
ð1aÞ
IRMi ¼ β0 þ βlOBTBi þ β2DummyUNDERi
þβ3DummyOVERi þ β4OBPOPi
þβ5MEDPERSi þ β6OTHPERSi
þβ7PHARMi þ β8TOTPRODi þ ui
ð1bÞ
Where, OBTB is the number of occupied beds to the
number of available beds for each HCA; DummyUNDER
is 1 if OBTB < 0.65, 0 otherwise; DummyOVER is 1 if
OBTB > 0.89, 0 otherwise; OBPOP is the number of oc-
cupied beds to the resident population, MEDPERS are
the costs of the medical personnel scaled by the resident
population; OTHPERS are the costs of professional,
technical, and administrative human resources scaled by
population; PHARM are the costs for surgery and med-
ical materials and pharmaceuticals to the population;
and TOTPROD are total operating costs to the popula-
tion. The meaning of the variables is better described in
par. 3.2 and i varies across time (2001–2009) and space
(HCAs of BA, BR, BT, FG, LE, TA). Data are run using
Gretl and R statistical programs.
The unreported White test shows the need of robust-
ness for hetheroskedasticity errors in both regressions.
Thus, we apply the pooled OLS HAC model to the
regressions and undertake the Hausmann panel diagnos-
tic test. On both regressions (1a) and (1b), the adequacy
of a Fixed Effects Panel Model compared to the Pooled
OLS Model is noticed, being statistically significant to
the time-demeaned effect of the intercepts. The succes-
sive Breusch-Pagan test suggests the Fixed Effects PanelModel is more adequate than the alternative Pooled
OLS Model and Random Effects Panel Model.
ERMit ¼ β1OBTBit þ β2DummyUNDERit
þβ3DummyOVERit þ β4OBPOPit
þβ5MEDPERSit þ β6OTHPERSit
þβ7PHARMit þ β8TOTPRODit þ αi þ uit
ð2aÞ
IRMit ¼ β1OBTBit þ β2DummyUNDERit
þβ3DummyOVERit þ β4OBPOPit
þβ5MEDPERSit þ β6OTHPERSit
þβ7PHARMit þ β8TOTPRODit þ αi þ uit
ð2bÞ
where t = 2001,. . .,2009 and i = BA, BR, BT, FG, LE, TA,
and variables assume the meaning stated above.
We test errors for hetheroskedasticity in groups
through the Wald test and find the variance of the errors
being inconstant between groups [(2a): χ2-stat = 168.88
p-value 0.00; (2b): χ2-stat = 149.7 p-value 0.00].
Then, we adopt the model with robustness to
hetheroskedasticity errors and find normally distributed
idiosyncratic errors [χ2-stat = 0.898 with p-value = 0.63
in (2a) and χ2-stat = 2.44 with p-value = 0.63 in (2b)].
The model is quite consistent in both cases, with
Adjusted-R2 = 0.73 and Akaike Criterion = −501.3 in (2a)
and Adjusted-R2 = 0.97 and Akaike Criterion = −460.2
in (2b).
Coefficients for the regressions are in Table 5 and
Table 6.
Results
The Fixed Effects Panel Model we used shows a strong
relationship between most of the independent variables
we chose and the dependent ones. Here, we elaborate on
the statistically significant results of the regressions, and
discuss their economic usefulness.
Extra-regional migration (ERM) seems negatively
influenced by the hospitalization index (OBPOP) with a
coefficient of −0.02 (p-value = 0.00). Thus, while enhan-
cing the number of hospitalized population, the extra-
regional migration phenomenon decreases. Infrastructures
are basically adequate to the populations’ needs. The issue
is better investigated in the analysis of OBTB, joined with
the analysis of DummyUNDER and DummyOVER. OBTB
is in a positive relation with the extra-regional out-
migration, with a coefficient equal to 0.013 (p-value =
0.00); an over-occupation of beds appears to produce a
higher total migration, suggesting that overcrowding of
hospital public structures might invite patients to go away.
We check the evaluation of extreme cases of over-
utilization with DummyOVER, which is negatively related
Table 5 Fixed effects panel model (HAC)
ERMit ¼ β1OBTBit þ β2DummyUNDERit þ β3DummyOVERit þ β4OBPOPit þ β6NOTHPERSitþ
β7PHARMit þ β8TOTPRODit þ αi þ uit
Variable Predicted sign coeff. p-value
Const 0.0019 0.20
OBTB +/− 0.0137 0.00
DummyOVER +/− −0.0031 0.00
DummyUNDER + 0.0024 0.00
OBPOP ? −0.0214 0.00
MEDPERS - 0.0000 0.02
OTHPERS + 0.0000 0.00
PHARM - −0.0000 0.12
TOTPROD + −0.0000 0.21
Adj-R2 0.73 Schwarz Cr.(BIC) = −473 Akaike Cr.(AIC) = −501
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probably excluding the inadequacy of infrastructures as
one probable reason of inefficiency. Intuitively, the more
crowded the hospital, the greater might be its appeal to
patients. The DummyUNDER, on the other hand, is posi-
tively related with out-migration (coeff. = 0.002, p-value =
0.00) as deserted hospitals seem to be a further cause of
out-migration because patients do not trust those centers,
probably due to prior bad personal or indirect experiences.
An interesting relationship occurs between cost
regressors and the regressands. In the ERM regression,
both kinds of labor costs (physician and non-physician)
are positively related with the passive mobility
phenomenon, measuring for MEDPERS a coeff. =
0.00005 (p-value = 0.02) and for OTHPERS a coeff. =
0.00018 (p-value = 0.00). Hence, spending for personnel
does not make the HCA more competitive and patients
cross the borders of the region notwithstanding the
monetary efforts of their resident HCA in providing
services. In particular, we expected a positive sign forTable 6 Fixed effects panel model (HAC)
IRMit ¼ β1OBTBit þ β2DummyUNDERit þ β3DummyOVERit þ β4OB











Adj-R2 0.97OTHPERS, considering the administrative and general
costs to be a probable waste. We did not expect a posi-
tive sign in MEDPERS. By the way, omitted variables
probably affect the results of our analysis because we
cannot individuate those cases that really need to pass
over the borderline due to the specific disease they
suffer and due to the circumstance that those services
are not provided within Apulia. PHARM and TOTPROD
are not statistically significant in the explanation of
ERM. Thus, raising the expenditure is generally not
appreciated by the population involved in the extra-
regional migration.
In the explanation of IRM, OBPOP is not statistically
significant, while the results of the analysis of OBTB
(coeff. = 0.0148, p-value = 0.02), DummyOVER (coeff. =
−0.0052, p-value = 0.01) and DummyUNDER (coeff. =
0.0060, p-value = 0.00) are consistent with the findings
of the extra-regional observation. Thus, an overcrowded
medical center seems to attract more patients than a











Schwarz Cr.(BIC) = −432 Akaike Cr.(AIC) = −460
Mafrolla and D'Amico Health Economics Review 2013, 3:3 Page 10 of 13
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/3/1/3On the one hand, in the IRM regression, the expend-
iture on salaries for physician personnel diminishes the
infra-regional migration phenomenon with a coefficient
of −0.00012 (p-value = 0.00). Then, in the infra-regional
migration, patients appreciate the expenditure on phys-
ician human resources, probably procuring a higher
quality of health care services, as predicted.
On the other hand, the expenditure in medical and
pharmaceutical provisions (PHARM) and the total cost
of production (TOTPROD) are positively related to
the migration index (coeff. = 0.0000 p-value = 0.00 and
coeff. = 0.0000 p-value = 0.01, respectively); the more the
HCAs spend, the less the patients trust the quality of
their services. Hence, patients generally seem to consider
every kind of expenditure in the local HCA as a waste of
money and have different reasons to choose to leave
their HCA. The Fixed Effects Panel Model for the re-
gression picks up different constant terms for each




OBTB DummyOVER DummyUNDER OB
OBTB + - 0.01 (0.07) 0.00
DummyOVER - −0.00 (0.03) - −0.00
DummyUNDER + −0.00 (0.45) 0.00 (0.02)
OBPOP - −0.02 (0.00) −0.02 (0.00) −0.02
MEDPERS + 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00
OTHPERS + 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00
PHARM - −0.00 (0.19) −0.00 (0.09) −0.00
TOTPROD - −0.00 (0.10) −0.00 (0.19) −0.00
Adj-R2 0.73 0.67 0.72 0.72 0
BIC −473 −465 −472 −474 −





OBTB + - 0.00 (0.26) 0.00
DummyOVER - −0.00 (0.11) - −0.00
DummyUNDER + 0.00 (0.12) 0.00 (0.03)
OBPOP + 0.00 (0.18) 0.00 (0.31) −0.00
MEDPERS - −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00
OTHPERS + 0.00 (0.42) 0.00 (0.59) 0.00
PHARM + 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00
TOTPROD + 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00
Adj-R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0
BIC −432 −429 −430 −427 −
AIC −460 −455 −456 −453 −
° In brackets: two-tails p-values.remaining motivations are contained in the αi term and
probably differ between cross-sections.
The difference in the evaluation of PHARM between
patients migrating out of the region and within the re-
gional borders (even if not statistically meaningful) could
be due to the quite common pharmaceutical expense pol-
icy within the region. Thus, differences in expenditure
within Apulia is probably due to waste. While choosing a
different region can be due to different reimbursement
policies, patients might evaluate a higher expense of their
resident HCA positively when they have to decide to cross
the regional borderlines. On the other side, they probably
do not appreciate wastage when they choose between the
different HCAs operating within the region.
Finally, we can state that some managerial inefficiency
can be found in the overall production system, suggesting
the possibility of a worrying waste of productivity in
the procurement of materials or in their utilization.
Henceforth, most migration is explained by infra-regionalopped variables
POP MEDPERS OTHPERS PHARM TOTPROD
(0.12) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
(0.00) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
- 0.00 (0.11) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
(0.00) - −0.01 (0.00) −0.02 (0.00) −0.02 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
(0.06) −0.00 (0.59) - 0.00 (0.04) −0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01)
(0.00) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) - 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
(0.08) −0.00 (0.35) −0.00 (0.99) −0.00 (0.77) - 0.00 (0.39)
(0.23) 0.00 (0.32) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.84) −0.00 (0.15) -
.58 0.69 0.71 0.74 0.73
451 −469 −471 −476 −476
477 −495 −497 −502 −502
opped variables
yUNDER OBPOP MEDPERS OTHPERS PHARM TOTPROD
(0.96) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.00)
(0.20) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.02) −0.00 (0.03) −0.00 (0.00)
- 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
(0.21) - −0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.36) 0.00 (0.35) −0.00 (0.43)
(0.00) −0.00 (0.00) - −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.95)
(0.00) 0.00 (0.39) 0.00 (0.28) - 0.00 (0.26) 0.00 (0.44)
(0.04) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.23) 0.00 (0.00) - 0.00 (0.09)
(0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -
.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96
436 −418 −434 −430 −431
462 −444 −460 −456 −439
Table 8 Random effects panel model (GLS) with Italian
regional sample
ERMit = β1OBPOPit + β2MEDPERSit + β3OTHPERSit + β4PHARMit
+ β5TOTPRODit + αi + uit




OBPOP + 0.0489 0.04
MEDPERS - 6.7046 0.46
OTHPERS - −69.663 0.07
PHARM + 11.001 0.00





*** >0.99% significance level; ** > 0.95% significance level; * >0.90
significance level.
Mafrolla and D'Amico Health Economics Review 2013, 3:3 Page 11 of 13
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/3/1/3moving and the efficiency in spending can be a deterrent
to the exodus. Nevertheless, patients crossing the regional
limits might take their decision irrespective of the HCAs’
efforts in spending on personnel’s salaries to offer better
services. By enhancing the costs, patients simply seem to
be driven away.
Robustness of the results
In order to assess the consistency of the reported results
with the hypotheses, we conduct some additional tests
to determine if any of our assumptions is likely to be
false.
We conduct the sensitivity analysis in two ways.
First, we undertake a traditional backward elimination
process [34: 339–342] on the independent variables
adopted in the model, dropping the controls first and
the explanatory variables next (Table 7). The results of
our analysis are basically unmodified when we drop, one
by one, the independent variables. The predictive signs
are basically confirmed at high significance levels and
the Adjusted-R2 and Bayesian criteria keep consistent,
notwithstanding the dropped variables.
When we drop two or more explanatory variables, the
model starts losing significance.
In a second step, we undertake a different analysis to
test the sensitivity of our model on a different sample.
The main problem of robustness of our results depends
on the low number of HCAs involved in the analysis
(N = 6). Unfortunately, the data we used are not publicly
released. We need to evaluate the firm-level of health
care, avoiding the problem of comparing single hospitals
and medical centers, which are extremely heterogeneous,
differently sized, and generally specialized in treatments
for particular diseases. Thus, we chose the “per-HCAs”
level of disaggregation, in order to be able to give some
critical remark from a managerial point of view. Those
data (and the permission to elaborate and publish them)
should be kindly conceded by regional or national health
care authorities. We only obtained data and permissions
from the Apulia Regional Authority. Thus, summing up
the data of the (unobserved) HCAs, we get the (observed)
regional heath care (RHC) analysis. The new sample size
is 21, including all 20 Italian regions, 1 of which is
separated into its 2 autonomous provinces.
Thus, the second block of robustness checks examines
the sensitivity of our extra-regional migration analysis
to:
i) sample selection
ii) proxy measurement choice of the dependent
variable
iii) proxy measurement choice of the independent
control variables
iv) functional form adopted in the regressionShortly, we would test a different model specification
on a different sample, with the aim of finding similar
results in order to confirm our assumptions.
Regrettably, we have no possibility to change the four
elements above step by step, due to a lack of the neces-
sary data. Thus, we try a different analysis, changing all
the elements at once.
Sub i), we examine the sensitivity of our results in
equation (2a) to a different sample, aggregating HCAs at
a regional level. In the meantime, in sub ii), we use the
MIGPOP index measured in our analysis to consider the
number of patients migrating in and out, and the length
of the treatment. It does not consider difficulties in care-
giving. Thus, in this sort of robustness test, we adopt a
proxy of (in)efficiency in health care based on three dif-
ferent elements (the number of patients times the length
of treatment times the difficulty of treatment). Sub iii),
we drop the OBTB, DummyOVER, and DummyUNDER
because those data are not available. Finally, in sub iv),
we use a different model to fit the data, changing Fixed
Effects Panel Model to Random Effects Panel Model.
The Random Effects is not applicable to the Apulia sam-
ple due to insufficient degrees of freedom, but is more
suitable for the Italian sample.
Basically, the results of our analysis on the total Italian
sample, with slightly different variables, remain similar
to those reported in Table 5 and the predicted signs are
confirmed in statistically relevant variables (Table 8).
The robustness of the findings helps to indentify some
critical assumptions and to assess the validity of the model
not only in Apulia regional borders, but all over the Italian
health care system, involving both the areas affected by
passive (like Apulia) and active migration phenomena.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the behavior of patients in rela-
tion with expenditure in public health care.
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far from home in order to get a health treatment is not a
casual decision. The fact that some areas in Italy (espe-
cially in southern Italy) regularly experience severe pas-
sive performances in migration indexes is extremely
meaningful. We found regular and consolidated relations
between some cost and activity indicators and the pas-
sive mobility phenomenon, adding some empirical evi-
dence to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, no
prior research tests the sensibility of patients to the way
the HCA allocates its resources. Thus, we argument and
predict correlations between variables and find evidence
of a certain relevance of the issue.
Spending in the proper way on health care could bring
about an enhancement of performances. Instead, wasting
resources seems to be immediately perceived by the pa-
tient and probably leads him to an adverse behavior.
Our first hypothesis seems to be confirmed in the re-
gression analysis. Different ways of spending (i.e. different
managerial choices of resources’ allocation) appear to pro-
duce an effect on citizens. Patients seem to evaluate the
spending policies adopted by their resident HCAs, and,
“voting by their feet”, convey the impression of out-
migrating when the HCA spends improperly, wasting
money in costs that are not critical to the quality of the
health care service provided. Even our second hypothesis
seems to be confirmed by results. The “voting by feet”
choice seems more sensitive to various managerial
patterns of spending when the distance from the alternate
HCA is shorter. Thus, it is feasible that the infra-regional
mobility is strongly and differently influenced by various
spending choices. On the other side, the extra-regional
mobility apparently is influenced by wasting in general
and might lead the patient to out-migrate when the total
operating costs arise. Different possible ways of spending
are less relevant. Thus, the spatial element influences the
“vote by feet” and we need to deflate the observation of
the phenomenon of mobility in order to mitigate the
measure of distances.
Further investigation could be interesting. First, the
enlargement of the sample, broadening the perimeter of
the analysis even to the active-migration areas, could
ameliorate our thesis and consolidate our findings. The
unusual robustness test we adopt using regional
disaggregated data predicts the consistency of our
findings at a national level. Nevertheless, the analysis on
the specific sample of Apulia is a cogent addition to lit-
erature, as few studies of efficiency in health care have
been undertaken in Italy before and only one in Apulia.
Second, a more capillary analysis might add other in-
dependent variables, testing other relevant components
of the productivity in health care, like investments in
medical devices, length of waiting lists, and surveys on the
satisfaction of inpatients and outpatients. Unfortunately,data on those aspects are neither easy to collect nor pro-
vided by the regional or national authorities.
Endnote
aOther autonomous public hospitals, clinics, and med-
ical centers operating on the same territory of the target
HCA are not included in this analysis.
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